Insurance as Community Property by McLeod, William L., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 4
June 1957
Insurance as Community Property
William L. McLeod Jr.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William L. McLeod Jr., Insurance as Community Property, 17 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol17/iss4/5
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
BATON ROUGE 3, LOUISIANA
Subscription per year $5.00 (Foreign $5.50) Single copy $1.25
VOLUME XVII JUNE, 1957 NUMBER 4
STUDENT BOARD
Harry R. Sachse, Editor-in-Chief
Jesse D. McDonald, Managing Editor
Thomas D. Hardeman, Associate Editor
George W. Hardy III, Associate Editor
Richard F. Knight, Associate Editor
Daniel J. McGee, Associate Editor
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr. Albert L. Dietz, Jr. John B. Hussey, Jr.
Burrell J. Carter Chester A. Eggleston Bernard R. Kramer
William H. Cook, Jr. Fred R. Godwin William L. McLeod, Jr.
James L. Pelletier
FACULTY ADVISORY BOARD
Dale E. Bennett Milton M. flarrison Robert A. Pascal
Harriet S. Daggett Paul M. Hebert Charles A. Reynard
Joseph Dainow Henry G. McMahon Alvin B. Rubin
Melvin G. Dakin Wex S. Malone J. Denson Smith
George W. Pugh, Faculty Editor
Beverly D. Walker, Editorial Assistant
COMMENTS
Insurance as Community Property
This discussion concerns itself with community property as
it relates to those types of insurance which seek to guarantee
subsistence payments while the insured has either temporarily
or permanently ceased his normal occupation. These types of
insurance are annuity policies, disability policies, workmen's
compensation, and unemployment compensation.
A discussion of this nature must begin with the rule laid
down for the determination of the separate or community char-
acter of the proceeds of life insurance. Announced in the case of
Estate of Moseman, the rule is that the interest in the insurance
contract becomes vested and its character determined at the
time of the creation of the contract.' From this it follows that if
the policy is taken out before marriage, the proceeds are the sep-
1. 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
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arate property of the insured.2 If taken out during the marriage,
the policy will yield proceeds which are community property.3
The basis of this rule is Article 2334 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which provides that separate property is "that which either
party brings into the marriage," and that common property is
"that which is acquired by the husband and wife during mar-
riage." The life insurance rule combines this community prop-
erty definition with the idea that the interest in a contract
vests at the moment of the creation of the contract. It is the
property in this interest which is brought into the marriage. 4
Therefore, in practical application if a contract of life insurance
is taken out by an unmarried man, the rights represented there-
by will be his separate property. If the insured marries, the
status of the contract's interest will remain constant, i.e., sep-
arate.
Annuity Contracts
The courts have applied the life insurance rule to annuity
contracts.5 It should be recognized, however, that the status of
annuities as insurance is questionable, but that this status as
insurance vel non has no effect on the problem of the character
of the proceeds. Many modern annuity policies take the form
of a refund annuity contract.0 This provides that the annuitant
may name a beneficiary to receive the balance of the amount
paid for the annuity, should that amount not be paid out to the
2. Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) ; Estate of Mose-
man, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
3. Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917); Succession of
Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902).
4. Estate of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219, 222 (1886).
5. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 510, 86 So.2d 169, 174 (1956).
The Louisiana Civil Code has made provision for annuities in articles 2793-2800.
This type of annuity contemplates the delivery of a sum of money to another
party who agrees to pay a rent to the annuitant. The parties may contract as to
time, amount, and redemption. The jurisprudence has decided that these provisions
as to definition of annuity are "by no means all-inclusive" (Succession of Cotton,
172 La. 819, 825, 135 So. 368, 370 (1931)), and that "there is nothing in these
articles forbidding the making of a contract of annuity on terms different from
those mentioned in the articles" (Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 236, 9 So.2d
529, 531 (1942)).
This has permitted the development of numerous annuity provisions allowing
payment of the annuity in a single sum or in installments, redemption of the
deposit at any time prior to commencement of payment by the company, and
designation of a beneficiary to receive the balance of the unpaid consideration at
the death of the annuitant. Another variation has been the group annuity con-
tract, whereby an employer may contract for his employees to receive an annuity
at their retirement. This type is paid for primarily by the employer, though the
employee may contribute smaller sums.
6. For examples, see Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So.2d 859 (1945) ,
Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So.2d 529 (1942).
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annuitant himself by the time of his death. Because of this pro-
vision the courts have held the refund annuity to be an invest-
ment pure and simple.7 "From the viewpoint of risk, the dif-
ference between a life insurance policy and an annuity contract
is diametric."" However, it is conceivable that an annuity con-
tract, like life insurance, would involve the shifting of risk of
a single policyholder onto a much larger group of policyholders.
This would occur if the annuitant paid the insurer premiums in
contemplation of the insurer's repaying a set sum beginning at
a certain age and lasting for the insured's life. In this situation
the annuitant hopes to pay less to the insurer than he will receive
during his retirement period, but the insurer gambles on the
financially ideal situation of the annuitant's demise after paying
all the premiums but before the retirement payments begin. Ap-
parently this type of annuity which is insurance has never met
with a popularity equal to that of the refund annuity contract.9
The reason lies in the return to the annuitant's beneficiary of
the amount paid in to the insurer. It is this lack of risk which
enables the court to characterize the annuity as an investment
rather than as insurance. Nevertheless, the Louisiana statute
classifies annuities under life insurance, 10 probably because ad-
ministration is simplified since both annuity and life insurance
provisions are often in the same policy. In this Comment, an-
nuity contracts will be referred to as insurance, although this is
not to say that annuities are invariably insurance.
The case of Messersmith v. Messersmith" involved the deter-
mination of the ownership of an annuity policy acquired by the
husband during the community. The spouses, separated from
bed and board, were trying to determine the separate or com-
munity character of the contract. The court decided that the
contract of annuity was an incorporeal, movable thing which
had been acquired by the husband during the community. By
applying the life insurance rule to these facts, the court decided
that the interest in the annuity contract was community prop-
erty.
2
It must be borne in mind that the rationale in the Messer-
smith case is only a general rule. There are a number of compli-
7. Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 645, 21 So.2d 859, 860 (1945).
8. Id. at 647, 21 So.2d at 861.
9. Hagy v. Kelly, 135 N.J. Eq. 436, 438, 39 A.2d 386, 388 (1944).
10. LA. R.S. 22:6(1) (1950).




cating factors which may affect the community or separate char-
acter of the proceeds of an annuity contract. The first compli-
cating factor is the payment with community funds of the
premiums of a policy the proceeds of which will be separate
property according to the general rule. The question 13 is whether
the payment with community funds should make the proceeds
community in the same proportion as the community premiums
are to the separate premiums, 14 or whether the proceeds of the
policy should remain separate. The Louisiana courts have not
been faced with this problem in regard to annuity payments.
However, an analogy can be drawn to life insurance in connec-
tion with which the problem has on two occasions been litigated.
The decision of the courts has been that the proceeds remain
separate, but that the separate estate which has been enriched
by funds from the community must reimburse the community
for the amount taken from it.' 5 In Succession of Verneuille the
court, in discussing reimbursement for premiums paid with com-
munity funds on a policy the interest in which was separate, said,
"the community is unquestionably entitled to the amount. The
separate estate cannot be benefited by payments for its benefit
and not be indebted for them. This was not disputed at bar."' 6
There is no apparent reason why this same conclusion would not
be reached in the case of an annuity contract purchased before
marriage.
A second question concerns the possibility of purchasing dur-
ing the community an annuity policy the proceeds of which will
be separate. One of the basic rules in determining the character
13. The question is not faced in disability insurance because the nature of the
proceeds is determined at the time the policy attains value, i.e., disability of the
insured. If the policy is paid for with community funds, and then the spouses
divorce before the occurrence of disability, there would logically be no reimburse-
ment of the community required. This is because reimbursement is required only
when community funds are diverted to separate property, but in Easterling v.
Succession of Lamkin, 211 La. 1089, 31 So.2d 220 (1947), the court held that a
disability policy before disability is not even property.
The problem does not arise in workmen's or unemployment compensation be-
cause these types of insurance require no payments by the insured.
14. This rule has been adopted in California and Washington in connection
with life insurance. For a discussion of this point see 1 DEFuNIAR:, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 79, n. 43 (1943).
15. Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) ; Estate v. Mose-
man, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
16. 120 La. 605, 609, 45 So. 520, 522 (1908). In the case of immovable prop-
erty the same rule holds, viz., that the improvements retain their separate char-
acter, but that the community must be reimbursed. Succession of Burke, 107 La.
82, 31 So. 391 (1902) ; Succession of Webre, 49 La. Ann. 1491, 22 So. 390 (1897).
It is suggested in 1 DEFUNIASI, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 79 (1943),




of property is that the character of the funds used in purchasing
will determine the character of that which is purchased. 17 In the
Louisiana jurisprudence no case was found which litigated this
point in relation to insurance, but there are cases in connection
with immovables. If a wife buys an immovable with her para-
phernal property, the courts allow her to prove that the prop-
erty was so purchased, thereby giving to the immovable the
character of separate property.'8 In other words, by evidence
the wife is allowed to overcome the presumption that that which
is bought during the existence of the community is community
property. In the case of the husband the courts have allowed
the rule of separate funds buying separate property to prevail,
but have subjected the husband to definite restrictions. In buy-
ing an immovable the husband must declare in the act of pur-
chase (1) that the funds used to purchase were his separate
property, and (2) that the purchase is made for his individual
account.19 The use of only one of these two declarations is in-
sufficient.2 0 The reason behind this restriction is to bind the
husband irrevocably, so that he will be unable subsequently to
abandon the property to the community in order to exercise upon
it, as a creditor, a right of priority for the replacement of the
sum expended for the purchase. The reason that this does not
apply to property purchased by the wife is that third parties
are put on guard as to the possibility of the title's being sep-
arate when they see it in the wife's name, but such is not the
case when the property is in the husband's name.21
When these ideas are applied to annuity insurance, there ap-
pears to be no reason why the husband cannot purchase a sep-
arate policy during the community, providing there is in the
policy adequate notice of the irrevocably separate nature. A
question arises as to whether such notification of the separate
funds is required at the payment of each premium. No law has
been found on this point. Consider, however, that if the an-
nuitant makes such a statement of separateness at the payment
of each premium, there is compliance with the letter of the law
and, therefore, no problem. If the annuitant simply makes the
17. This is the necessary implication from cases such as Succession of Hemen-
way, 228 La. 572, 83 So.2d 377 (1955) ; Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70
So.2d 670 (1953).
18. Krokroskia v. Martin, 61 So.2d 630 (La. App. 1952).
19. Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902).
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 72, 34 So. at 134. For a discussion of this, see DAOOETT, THE COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 28 (1931).
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statement of separateness at the purchase of the contract but
not at each premium payment thereafter, a way is opened for
him to pay the premiums with community funds. Should this
happen, however, it would seem to be only a matter of evidence
to prove how much the community was entitled to receive from
the separate estate which had been enriched with community
funds. The opinion that an annuity contract bought during com-
munity can be separate providing adequate notice is given re-
quires an addition to the annuity status rule, namely, that the
annuity's status is linked to the annuitant's status at purchase,
providing the annuitant makes no stipulation to the contrary.
Disability Insurance
The rationale applicable to life insurance and annuity insur-
ance, that the interest in the contract vests at the formation
of the contract, has not been applied to disability insurance. This
is demonstrated by the case of Easterling v. Succession of Lam-
kin,22 the only case found on the community status of disability
insurance. Here the insured, prior to his marriage, bought a life
insurance policy with a disability provision. During the exist-
ence of the community the insured was disabled and thereby
became eligible for disability payments. The insurer did not
make disability payment until after the insured's death. The
question arose as to the community or separate status of the
proceeds. Since the policy was bought before the insured's mar-
riage, the collateral heirs maintained that by virtue of the life
insurance rule the proceeds were part of the deceased's separate
estate. The court answered that life insurance and disability
insurance are to be distinguished on the basis of the pecuniary
value of the policy. Life insurance has a reserve or cash sur-
render value during the entire lifetime of the insured. There-
fore, since it has value from the formation of the contract, it is
property from that time. On the other hand, disability insurance
has no value until such time as the disability which authorized
the payment of benefits arises. This means, according to the
court's rationale, that there is no value in the contract itself,
and without value there can be no such thing as property. The
court applied this conclusion to Article 2334 of the Civil Code
and reasoned that this could not be separate property as men-
tioned in paragraph two,2 because there was no property which
22. 211 La. 1089, 31 So.2d 220 (1947).
23. "Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or
1957]
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was brought into the marriage. The court said that, since the
provisions defining separate property were not applicable, the
property was community.
24
These two decisions create in the jurisprudence of Louisiana
two conflicting means of determining the character of the pro-
ceeds of insurance. The annuity rule depends on the time of
the creation of the contract, but the disability rule depends on
the time of the creation of value. The situation is all the more
perplexing when it is realized that either rationale is applicable
to both types of insurance, and that the divergence is therefore
unnecessary. For instance, the criterion of value could be applied
to the contract of annuity. Some annuity insurance contracts
have been held to create a fund continually belonging to the
annuitant, even though for a period the fund is under the direct
control of the insurer.25 The first payment by the annuitant
into his fund would create value in the contract, and it could
be said that the community or separate character of the annuity
vested at this time. Since the first payment probably would be
made at the time of entry into the contract, this would have the
same effect as the rule which depends on the time of the con-
tract. The type of annuity dealt with in the Messersmith case,
however, was a group annuity, with the annuitant holding an
individual certificate which in itself was valueless, according to
the court. It was simply a contract which could have no actual
value until the annuitant's retirement, resignation from the com-
pany, or death. In the case of an annuity such as this, the com-
munity or separate character would be determined only when
the value actually arose.
An application of the annuity rationale to the disability
policy would mean that the character would vest at the time of
the creation of the disability contract. It is to be noted that
there was a dissent in the Easterling case which, if followed,
would have applied to disability policies the same rule as applied
in life insurance and annuities.2 6
The basis of this diversity of reasoning may be in Chief Jus-
acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by dona-
tion made to him or her particularly."
24. Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin, 211 La. 1089, 1096, 31 So.2d 220, 223
(1947).
25. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir. 1941) ; Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So.2d 859 (1945) ; Succession
of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So.2d 529 (1942).
26. 211 La. 1089, 1099, 31 So.2d 220, 224 (1947).
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tice O'Niell's statement in the Easterling case that the disability
payment was "in lieu of or as compensation for the loss of earn-
ing capacity of the insured. '27 Of course, the husband's wages
had he not been injured would have been part of the com-
munity.28 Since the disability payment was meant to substitute
for wages, the court may simply have thought it proper to
analogize wages and disability payments in this respect, in order
to afford a measure of protection for the wife. Because of the
facility with which the rule applied to life insurance contracts
could have been used, it seems probable that the Easterling
rationale was developed to fit the policy of protection for the
wife. Though this policy reason may be commendable, there
appears to be no means of distinguishing the cases of disability
and annuity, because annuity may well be viewed as a substitute
for wages at a time when the annuitant is too old to work.
Workmen's Compensation
Workmen's compensation payments present a third way of
looking at the problem of distributing subsistence payments.
Based on statute, the workman's recovery is predicated on the
notion that all of the users of the commodity made by the in-
dustry in which the accident occurred should bear the expenses
of the injury. In this sense of shifting the burden to a large
group, the workmen's compensation statute is similar to insur-
ance. However, the worker himself pays no premiums, and looks
to statute and not contract to recover for his injury. Therefore,
there is a basic difference between workmen's compensation and
annuity and disability insurance. Because of the statutory basis
of compensation, the court in Brownfield v. Southern Amuse-
ment Company29 held that workmen's compensation was not a
contract to the extent that all the law relative to contracts would
apply, in spite of the fact that one statutory requirement was
that there be a contract of employment between employer and
employee. The court held that the workmen's compensation
statute had within itself a definite statement of who was to be
allowed to bring suit. Because of this the Justices refused to
apply the rationale relating to the time of the contract as deter-
mining the character of the property, and also declined to go
along with the rationale that because compensation was a sub-
27. Ibid.
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
29. 196 La. 73, 198 So. 656 (1940).
1957]
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stitute for wages it was community property. Instead, the court
followed another line of reasoning which led to holding that
the right to sue in compensation was the separate property of
the person injured.80 The reason for this separate treatment of
workmen's compensation seems to lie in the fact that the act is
complete in itself. Without going outside the workmen's com-
pensation statute there can be found the types of injuries for
which recovery will be allowed, the party who will be required to
compensate for the injury, and the person who can recover. Be-
cause a complete remedy for injury has been afforded by the
legislature in a single statute, the court felt justified in treating
the statute as self-contained.81
It will be noticed that the Brownfield case decided that that
which was separate property was the right to sue, not neces-
sarily the compensation payments themselves. It has been argued
that when the cause of action is separate property, the judgment
recovered on it will be separate also. 82 However, no case in point
has been found in the Louisiana jurisprudence. It seems fair to
assume, that the courts, when faced with the problem of the
characterlof compensation payments, will resort to an analogy to
wages.
The court in Barr v. Davis Brothers Lumber Company held
that the main object of workmen's compensation is to provide
the employee with wages for subsistence until he can return to
work. 3 Therefore, it would be no change of rationale from the
disability cases to hold that the compensation payments are in
lieu of wages, and are therefore community property. This would
lead to the conclusion that the community or separate character
of workmen's compensation payments depend on the marital
status of the insured at the time of injury.
The death benefits under workmen's compensation arise for
the designated survivors on the death of the worker.84 There-
fore, the community having been terminated by death, and the
30. Ibid. The Brownfield case dealt specifically with a married woman's sep-
arate right to sue. However, the court used language so strong that it is likely
that a husband's right to sue would be his separate property also. See id. at 80,
198 So. at 659.
31. Note that this is not making the separate character of the property depend
on Louisiana Civil Code Article 2334, which makes the action for damages the
separate property of the -wife. Neither does it appear that Article 2334 would be
used to declare the husband's action for damages to be community property.
32. MCKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 343 (2d ed. 1925).
33. 183 La. 1013, 1023, 165 So. 185, 188 (1935).
34. LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950).
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action being allowed only to the survivor, the death benefit
would seem to be the separate property of the survivor.
Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment compensation is another variety of insurance
providing subsistence payments, but the jurisprudence has not
yet determined the community or separate character of the pay-
ments. The payments, provided for by statute, are made by the
state government to the unemployed worker.8 5 By its statutory
nature, this compensation insurance is not on the basis of con-
tract. The unemployed worker is primarily required to state the
fact of his unemployment and be able to work; for this he gets
his compensation pending employment.8 6 Thus there is no con-
tract, there are merely statutory requirements which must be
complied with in order that the benefits be paid. The lack of
contract renders impossible the application of the rule used in
annuity policies.
The Louisiana statute provides that compensation for un-
employment is a type of insurance which affords "benefits for
periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power
and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief as-
sistance. '8 7 This seems to be a clear indication that the legis-
lative intent was to provide a substitute for wages. This intent,
combined with the absence of the contractual factor, would seem
to require the consideration of unemployment compensation as
community property if the unemployment arose during mar-
riage. In other words, the status of the compensation would
be determined as of the time the unemployment occurs.
Conclusion
When one takes cognizance of the various ways in which
the present law treats insurance subsistence payments in deter-
mining the community character of the proceeds, it becomes
obvious that greater simplicity would be desirable in that it
would tend to reduce the possibility of error springing from
varied treatment of kindred problems. Annuity and disability
insurance, both of which are founded on contract, are so closely






the same rationale. The rationale most in accord with insurance
jurisprudence, and one easily and logically applied, is that which
declares the interest to vest at the time of the formation of the
contract. This is the life insurance rule, which, since it is well
settled and understood by the bench and bar, would minimize
error in application. Because workmen's compensation and un-
employment compensation are founded on statute, and not con-
tract, another rule can logically be maintained.
The writer is of the opinion that these two types of insur-
ance are so obviously a substitute for wages that they should be
treated as such, and their character be determined as of the time
the right to benefits arises.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
Real Estate Brokerage in Louisiana
The frequency with which real estate brokers must resort to
the courts for enforcement of compensative claims has created a
major source of litigation. The purpose of this Comment is to
make a short survey of the jurisprudence and operative legal
principles involved in that litigation in Louisiana. The writer
does not purport to survey all of the various exceptions and con-
tradictions which have been created, but rather to afford a gen-
eral discussidn of the more important developments in this area
of the law. There are various types of transactions which the
broker might effect for his principal. However, for convenience,
where the rules and principles are general this discussion will
be in terms of sale.
Statutory Regulations
A real estate broker is statutorily defined as any person who,
for compensation, "sells or offers for sale, buys or offers to buy,
or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of real estate, or
who leases or offers to lease, or rents or offers to rent, any real
estate or the improvements thereon for others as a vocation."1
Real estate salesmen 2 are merely employees of brokers and are
prohibited by statute from accepting commissions for the per-
1. LA. R.S. 37:1431(3) (1950).
2. Id. 37:1431(4).
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